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Relativism about truth can take various forms. The interesting relativism, ac-
cording to MacFarlane, is what he calls assessment-sensitivity. To show that
usual forms of relativism in semantics don’t enter the interesting territory of
relativism and thus to motivate assessment-sensitivity, MacFarlane puts consid-
erable time distinguishing assessment-sensitivity from non-indexical contextu-
alism. The difference is brought about by considering retraction data. For this
paper, by considering retraction data, we argue that whether speakers think
that they should retract a taste utterance they made in the past does not have
a clear answer.1 The intuition and the data suggest that some people do think
it appropriate to retract a previously made taste utterance and some people
don’t. Given this variance, we suggest a framework for context-dependence,
which makes room for both assessment-sensitivity and non-indexical contextual-
ism. Whether a given utterance is relativist in the assessment-sensitive way or in
the non-indexical contextualist way, we think, depends on the interpreter of the
utterance. This accounts for the variance in the judgments concerning whether
one should retract a past taste utterance or not. In this paper, we spend more
∗This is part of an ongoing project. Many thanks to Éno Agolli, Mitch Green,
Magdalena Kaufmann, Stefan Kaufmann, Zhiyu Luo, Dilip Ninan, and Lionel Shapiro
for comments and discussion. Thanks also to two anonymous reviewers for LENLS. All
mistakes are my own.
1Although we expand on what sort of utterances we take to be taste utterances, we
have in mind the usual utterances of personal taste like Licorice is tasty. Also note that
although we primarily consider retraction data about predicates of personal taste and
epistemic modals, the scope of this paper extends to all language for which a relativism
of the two sorts can be argued for.
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time in sketching a workable formalism for the proposal, and less time on philo-
sophical underpinnings and implications of such a relativized relativism, so to
speak.
In the process of cashing out the proposed formalism, we pay significant at-
tention to what Belnap, Perloff, and Xu (2001) call initialization.2 Initialization
may be thought of as another word for determination of a parameter in the index
of evaluation by the context. However, it highlights an important feature of the
Kaplanian context-dependence picture: that before any shifting (of a parameter)
occurs, there’s an initial value of the parameter in the index of evaluation set by
the context of utterance. We propose a formalization of initialization. Obviously,
it doesn’t hurt to make the theory more precise by formalizing an important step
of meaning composition. In addition however we also present reasons to think
that initialization is not just a way of speaking, but a process that requires for-
malization. We also highlight methodological reasons. Let’s explicitly state the
two aims of this paper:
(1) Formalizing initialization
(2) Proposing a formal model that makes space for both assessment-sensitivity
and non-indexical contextualism in an overall semantic theory
If (1) and (2) were unrelated, then it would be strategically poor to discuss both
in a short paper. We think that (2) crucially relies on (1). It is in our choice of
model that we use for (1) that makes it amenable to the sort aims associated
with (2).
Plan for rest of the paper : In §2, we explain the basic Kaplanian picture of
context-sensitivity in which both assessment-sensitivity (R) and non-indexical
contextualism (C) are couched. In §3, we explain the difference between R and
C. Here, we discuss the significance of retraction data. In §4, after reflecting on
some retraction data, we suggest a pluralism that makes space for both R and
C; here we also motivate formalizing initialization. In §5, we sketch a formal
model that achieves the aims outlined in §4.
2 Context-Sensitivity
The usual story with Kaplan’s two-dimensional framework starts with interpret-
ing each expression in language relative to a context and an index. What are
contexts and indices? For Kaplan, context models the actual context of speech.
Then, accordingly, a context is taken to include a speaker/author, a world, a
time, a location, etc. More formally, a context c is taken to be a sequence of such
parameters. Relativizing interpretation of each expression to a context formally
amounts to relativizing the standard interpretation function [[.]] to c, as in [[.]]c.
This increases the expressive power of our semantic theory, as we can easily de-
fine a single unambiguous rule that determines reference of indexicals such as
2Also see Belnap and Green 1994.
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I and now.3 However, modal and temporal displacements are key features of
natural language. In easier terminology: we can use language to talk about what
can be, what was, etc. instead of strictly talking about what actually obtains
at present. Then, there should be some way of shifting the parameters of the
context, which models the actual context of speech, to parameters which are
relevant for interpreting a given utterance. All cool, one can say, and suggest
that there are operators in language that can change a context c in such a way
that the changed c′ differs from c in its value for one of its parameters. In other
words, one can simply suggest shifting say the time parameter of c to an earlier
time for interpreting past utterances.
There are principled reasons to resist the above move. Let’s consider two such
reasons briefly. It is argued (cf. Rabern and Ball 2019) that context for Kaplan
has a theoretical role – that of generating content, where content is what one
believes and asserts. Then a semantic theory must make space for a step in
meaning composition where we obtain what we take to be the object of belief
and speech acts. Secondly, Lewis (1980) notes that context is just not the sort of
thing that one can shift. John can talk about matters before John was born, but
if we were to shift the time parameter of such a context, we would get a context
with a time before John was born with John in it. So, we come far away from
the independent motivations of modeling the actual context of speech for which
we posited c in the first place.
The more reasonable move to incorporate temporal and modal displacement
in a semantic theory is to keep c as it is, but posit an artificial object, call it
index (i for short), such that it is a sequence of those parameters of c that are
shiftable. Now, we have two objects to relativize [[.]] to, as in [[.]]ic. Accordingly,
we also get a division of labour between c and i, and a two step procedure to go
from an expression to its extension.4 To take an example, for a sentence S, at
c, first a content is generated. What this content looks like will depend on what
you take content to be, but for now, we can take it to be a set of world-time
pairs.5 Once this content is generated, at the time and world coordinate of the
index, we get a truth-value; 1 iff the world-time pair that constitutes the index
belongs to the content generated at c for S, 0 otherwise. In other words, some
semantic rules (character for Kaplan) determine the content at c. Content in
turn is a function that takes the index to some extension. Here, we don’t spend
any more time arguing for why this framework is preferable to other alternatives,
but the above considerations serve to show at the very least that the Kaplanian
picture is well-founded as a formalism with underlying theoretical and formal
considerations.6
3See Pickel et al. 2018
4Obviously, the two step procedure is not essential to context-dependence as Lewis
(1980) argues; uncurrying the two functions gives us one function.
5cf. Lewis (1979) and Perry (1979).
6For a critique, see Santorio (2017). Also see Schlenker 2003, Anand & Nevins
(2006), Deal (2020).
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Both R and C are positions couched in the above framework. Before we shift
our discussion to R and C, let us make a brief comment on the importance
of initialization in a theory of context-dependence. Note that a compositional
semantics for S, a sentence with a modal or temporal operator, will require
evaluation of the content of S relative to a world or time determined by com-
parison to the world or time of the context. Thus, the values of the parameters
of the index, before any shift, are set by the context. As these are the initial
values of the index, we can say that the context initializes the parameter values
in the index. This locution of Initialization comes from Belnap, Perloff, and Xu
(2001). Not only, as we said, we provide a formalization of initialization, the
notion is also important in understanding the difference between R and C. The
above background on the Kaplanian context-dependence framework suffices to
talk about MacFarlane’s co-opting of it for assessment-sensitivity.
3 Relativisms
Now, MacFarlane would insist on considering only assessment-sensitivity as the
interesting relativism. Although we agree, we don’t think it is important for us
to convince the reader of that for the purposes of this paper. Therefore, the
title of this section Relativisims is meant to include both assessment-sensitivity
and non-indexical contextualism. Here, we first sketch a picture of non-indexical
contextualism, and then introduce assessment-sensitivity. This sets up the stage
to bring out the differences in how each handles retraction data.
3.1 Non-indexical contextualism
Now, it would help to introduce some data about predicates of personal taste.
Take for instance, (3) and (4).
(3) Licorice is tasty.
(4) Licorice isn’t tasty.
Before we dive into the formalism, the conceptual point of non-indexical contex-
tualism can be illustrated by considering a speaker, say John, who likes licorice.
Now, inter alia, John constitutes a context. Non-indexical contextualist would
further say that the context of utterance of (3) or (4) also includes a taste stan-
dard (g (gastronomic) for short) as a parameter. Then, where 〈w, t, g〉 is an index
comprising a world, time, and taste parameter, one can define a compositional
semantics for tasty as in (5).
(5) [[tasty]]
〈w,t,g〉
c = λx. x is tasty according to g at t in w
Given the compositional semantics in (5), the content expressed at c is a set
of world-time-standard triples. So, in addition to worlds and times, we can let
contents be sensitive to taste standards as well. The step that follows is evalua-
tion of this expressed context at c with respect to a set of parameters of a given
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index, which, without any shift, constitute the world, time, and taste standard
of c, the context of utterance. We can call such an index – one containing initial
values of a set of parameters – the index of the context. (3) comes out true in c
as the taste standard g of c is such that licorice is tasty according to g in w at
t. Given the above sketch, we can arrive at a definition of truth of a proposition
in such a picture.7
(6) A proposition p is true as used at a context c iff p is true at 〈w, t, g〉.
This looks like a good picture capturing context-sensitivity of contents to taste.8
Now, we turn to assessment-sensitivity.
3.2 Assessment-sensitivity
As we see it, what distinguishes assessment-sensitivity from non-indexical con-
textualism, on a formal level, are (7), (8), and (9).
(7) Positing two contexts relevant for initialization of the index.
(8) Defining the truth of a proposition/sentence w.r.t. two contexts.
(9) Letting the role played by one of the two contexts in (8) to be associated
with assessment of the proposition/sentence.
In what follows, we expand on (7)-(9), and then by considering retraction data,
bring out the differences in predictions between non-indexical contextualism and
assessment-sensitivity. Let’s consider (7)-(9) now.
Let’s introduce two contexts as being relevant to a given proposition/sentence.
One of these contexts is the context of use, where the proposition or sentence
is used to make an utterance. The other relevant context is that of assessment,
where the utterance is assessed for truth. Now, given that we have two relevant
contexts, a natural question about the parameter values in the index arises. Re-
member that in the Kaplanian framework, a given sentence is interpreted with
respect to a context and an index, and we let the index comprise parameters
whose values are initialized by the context. Now that we have two posited con-
texts, it doesn’t make sense to say that the parameter values in the index are
7This definition of truth of a proposition is stated in the style MacFarlane adopts
in his 2014 (cf. MacFarlane 2014, 105).
8Note that both non-indexical contextualism and assessment-sensitivity assume
contents to be simple in that they are evaluated with respect to taste standards. The
more traditional contextualism (cf. Kratzer (1977), DeRose (1996), Soames (2002),
Stanley (2004)), which MacFarlane calls indexical contextualism would let contents be
such that before evaluation occurs, they are already specified with regards to the pa-
rameter that the non-indexical contextualist would consider relevant for evaluation of
the expressed content. In other words, under the traditional contextualism about taste
predicates, the content expressed by (3) would be a set of world-time pairs. Whether
contents are complex or not is an interesting question, but one too complicated to be
considered for the purposes of this paper. For a comparison between the two positions,
see MacFarlane (2009). Also see Cappelen & Hawthorne (2009).
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initialized by the context. This is where MacFarlane thinks we enter the inter-
esting territory of relativism; we can now let the parameter values according to
which the truth of a content is evaluated be initialized by the context of as-
sessment. Whether one does that or not for a particular parameter σ makes one
relativist in the interesting sense for σ. In less loaded terms, we can say that such
a decision makes one to propose assessment-sensitivity for σ. For instance, if one
lets the taste parameter be initialized by the context of assessment, then one is
considered assessment-sensitive about taste. Moreover, one is also considered to
propose assessment-sensitivity for an expression if the compositional semantics
for that expression makes reference to a parameter for which one lets its value be
initialized in the index by the context of assessment. What we have in mind here
is epistemic modals like might and the parameter information state, to which
reference is made in some compositional semantics.9
Now that in the assessment-sensitivity framework, two contexts are posited,
and a proposition is evaluated with respect to an index that can comprise pa-
rameters initialized by either the context of utterance or context of assessment,
we need to rethink the definition of truth of a proposition/sentence as in (6).
MacFarlane presents an assessment-sensitive definition of truth of a proposition
as in (10).
(10) A proposition p is true as used at a context c1 and assessed from context
c2 iff p is true at 〈wc1 , tc1 , gc2〉.
Given (10), the story from character to extension goes like this: first a composi-
tional semantics as in (5) is proposed which makes reference to some parameter
in its right hand side clause. This in turn specifies a content, or a proposition,
so to speak. This proposition is then evaluated with respect to an index that
comprises parameters s.t. their values can be initialized by either the context of
use or context of assessment. Further, note that the non-indexical contextualist
can embrace the two contexts, and also embrace that a proposition p’s truth is
defined at a context of use and context of assessment. All that the non-indexical
contextualist about a parameter σ needs to do to keep assessment-sensitivity at
bay is to propose that σ gets initialized by the context of use in defining the
truth of a proposition. For clarity, let’s summarize non-indexical contextualism
and assessment-sensitivity about taste below.
(11) Non-indexical Contextualism for g: A proposition p is true as used at a
context c1 and assessed from context c2 iff p is true at 〈wc1 , tc1 , gc1〉.
(12) Assessment-sensitivity for g: A proposition p is true as used at a context
c1 and assessed from context c2 iff p is true at 〈wc1 , tc1 , gc2〉.
Now, questions about significance of proposing assessment-sensitivity may arise.
The most relevant one for MacFarlane, and for us in this paper, is: do the two
9See Yalcin 2007, MacFarlane 2011, 2014 for such semantic theories. We mention
these just as one type of semantic theory for epistemic modals. See Ninan (2018) and
Mandelkern (2019) for interesting and independent critiques.
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positions differ in their predictions about some data? If they do, and Assessment-
Sensitivity makes better predictions, then one can see merit in adopting Mac-
Farlane’s framework. In the next section, we focus our attention to retraction,
where non-indexical contextualism and assessment-sensitivity come apart in the
predictions they make.10
4 Retraction
4.1 Non-indexical Contextualism vs Assessment-sensitivity
As we intend to refer to the two theories frequently here, we choose to abbreviate
them as C for non-indexical contextualism and R for assessment-sensitivity.
For MacFarlane, retraction becomes important in the context of constitutive
norms for speech acts. For reasons of space and appropriate audience, we avoid
discussion of constitutive norms for assertion and retraction. Instead, we try
to make sense of the difference between R and C in the context of retraction,
assuming that speakers retract past utterances that they take to be false.
Consider the example of Bano who found licorice tasty when she was 10
years old. She is 25 now, and hates the taste of licorice. Bano had uttered (3),
i.e. Licorice is tasty in 2005. Asked about it now, she takes it back. Now, take
C. If it is the context of use that initializes the taste parameter, g, in the index
of evaluation, then there’s no reason for Bano to take (3) back. At her context
of assessment in the present, (3) is still true, as it is still evaluated w.r.t. g of the
context of utterance, whose t is a moment in 2005. That doesn’t explain why
Bano feels the urge to take back her utterance given her changing tastes.
R has a different story to tell. As g is determined by the context of assessment
under R, (3) in the present time is evaluated to be false. As an utterance that
was made in 2005 is now taken to be false by Bano, she retracts it. It seems like
R has a story to tell about retraction that C misses. We think that although
this is a major achievement of the assessment-sensitivity framework, retraction
itself isn’t that simple.
4.2 Variance to remedy strength
We think that MacFarlane’s views about retraction are too strong. Taken from a
descriptive perspective, MacFarlane seems to propose that speakers will retract
their past utterances about taste if their tastes change, as in the Bano exam-
ple above. MacFarlane (2014, 141) comments: “Our account should explain why
speakers will retract (rather than stand by) an earlier assertion that something
was tasty, if the flavor the thing had at the time of the assertion is not pleas-
ing to their present tastes—even if it was pleasing to the tastes they had then.”
10MacFarlane seems committal only about his views on how retraction is handled by
assessment-sensitivity. Disagreement takes center stage for MacFarlane, only for him
to conclude that it’s messy, or at least that’s how we interpret him. For discussion on
disagreement, see MacFarlane (2014, §6).
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Note that MacFarlane makes the a priori judgment that speakers will retract an
earlier assertion. This seems like a strong judgment. Taken from a less descrip-
tive, and more normative perspective, as Ninan (2016, 445) notes MacFarlane’s
“Relativist Retraction Rule obliges A to retract the assertion she made in c.”
What if one doesn’t retract? What if one thinks that one need not retract?
Or what if Bano thinks that it isn’t appropriate for her to retract (3) in the
present? Given its reliance on strong views about retraction, R doesn’t seem like
the panacea we thought it to be anymore. But what about C? C, as MacFarlane
noted, wouldn’t make sense of why speakers do retract. The dialectic here might
seem confusing, but we are simply noting the fact that some speakers would
retract and some wouldn’t. In cases where they do, R seems like a good theory,
and in cases where they don’t, R doesn’t seem like a good theory. We propose
building a framework that can handle such variance. Our assumption here is
simply that whether a speaker retracts an earlier assertion depends on whether
that speaker considers it appropriate for her to retract the earlier assertion.
Now, there are many questions to be answered here. Firstly, how do we build
a space in our formalism for appropriateness judgments, upon which we would
take retraction patterns to rely? Second, and more importantly, how should we
build a model that can be true to the Kaplanian picture of context-sensitivity
that has a plethora of theoretical and formal virtues, while incorporating insights
by both R and C. We present a sketch below.
5 Pluralism
5.1 Motivations
Let’s state our motivations and assumptions explicitly. What motivates the pic-
ture here is the variance in retraction patterns. It is quite clear that there’s a
speaker, as MacFarlane presents the example of Joey (2014, 109), who would
retract an earlier assertion of (3) in the present where his taste standards have
changed. It is also true that there’s a speaker who would not retract an earlier
assertion of (3) in the present where her taste standards have changed. More-
over, we can imagine a speaker standing by their previous assertion of (3), by
finding it odd if an interlocutor asks them to take back their previous assertion.
Suppose that Bano and Joey are friends who are meeting after ten years. Joey
liked licorice so much as a kid that he wrote a document expressing his love
for it. On being offered licorice by Bano in the present, the following exchange
occurs.
(13) Joey: I won’t have licorice. I can’t stand it.
Bano: Wow! I still remember that document. So, you wrote it, just to
take back all of it?
Joey: I don’t take it back; after all, I liked licorice.
If the above exchange doesn’t qualify as illustrating Joey standing by his as-
sertion, then we invite the reader to think up of an explicit statement of what
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standing by would amount to; we think that there’s a speaker who would assert
such a statement, even when their tastes have changed.
By considering examples like (13), we are simply noting that to enforce a
blanket judgment about retraction on behalf of all speakers is not warranted. (13)
is not to be understood as data that suggests that speakers don’t retract their
past assertions about taste. We agree with MacFarlane insofar as in thinking
that at least some speakers do retract their past assertions. Our goal is to ignore
neither of the two judgments. We intend to explain more data than R or C
can explain on their own. Let’s start with our sketching a way to achieve this
interesting task.
5.2 Pluralism for variance
We embrace MacFarlane’s assessment-sensitivity framework. More specifically,
we make important use of the two contexts to state our thesis. Taking this as
point of departure, we think that there is a choice for the agent of the context
of assessment in how they interpret a taste utterance. We can state this more
systematically as in (14):
(14) Pluralism: For a proposition p, which is evaluated relative to a parameter
σ, given c1, context where the assertion of p is made, and c2, context
where the assertion of p is assessed, σ in the index can be initialized by
either c1 or c2.
Pluralism can be resisted if one goes a pragmatic route to explain the aberrant
data while espousing one of C or R. Then, at the very least, our proposal is a
semantic explanation for variance. Now, we want to implement (14) formally.
Two immediate questions that we face are: (i) how do we build this choice of
initialization; (ii) where in the formalism should we build this choice? In other
words, is there any space in the Kaplanian framework, supplemented with Mac-
Farlane’s two contexts, to include a feature underlying (14)? We think that there
is space if we look closely. Note that we don’t have a formalization for initializa-
tion in the context-dependence frameworks we work within. So, we propose to
formalize initialization.
5.3 Formalizing Initialization
Let’s first motivate our formalization. Why do we think that initialization re-
quires formalization? To answer this, let’s first state how we perceive initializa-
tion.
(15) Initialization of σ: the process of populating the index of evaluation with
σ where σ ∈ c1 or σ ∈ c2.
There is nothing controversial or new that we have said about initialization so
far. Probably, the only thing that we have added is our conception of it as a
process. Suppose that cu1 and cu2 are both contexts of utterance that differ in
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their value for σ, and σ in the index is initialized by the context of utterance.
Now, the value of σ in the index for evaluation of a proposition is determined by
whether we take cu1 or cu2 to be the context of utterance. What this simple fact
motivates is that initialization is to be thought of as a process that populates the
index with a parameter, while obeying the constraint that this parameter comes
from the context of utterance (if the parameter is initialized by the context of
utterance). In other words, the match between the initialized parameters of the
index and features of the context is to be obeyed. Moreover, there’s independent
motivation to formalize initialization in that it would make our theory of context-
dependence more precise. The precision is to be valued independently, but if one
doesn’t lean that way, then the value of precision can be found in its potential
benefits. The benefits we have in mind are those that we get when Farkas and
Bruce (2010) pay attention to and formalize the proposal bit in Stalnaker’s (1978)
account of assertion. Then, at the very least, there is some motivation to at least
pay a bit more attention to initialization in a theory of context-dependence. So,
how should we model it?
5.4 The model
Here, we build a model for Pluralism as stated in (14). Note that we are building
on the Kaplanian framework, supplemented with MacFarlane’s two contexts and
his definition of truth of a proposition. We conceive the context of utterance
and context of assessment together to determine an initialization procedure. We
understand procedure in a computationally loaded sense (cf. Suppes 1979) and
take it to be instantiated by a finite state automaton.
Let M1 model the initialization procedure at a given context of use and a
context of assessment. M1 is a 5-tuple (Σ, Q, q0, {q3, q4}, δ) such that:
(16) Σ: {0, 1}
(17) Q: {q0, q1, q2, q3, q4}
(18) q0 is the start state
(19) {q3, q4} is the set of accept states














In the above model, we presume that there are two relevant parameters for
evaluation of sentences in natural language. This feature is not essential to our
model. We choose the number ‘two’ to not make the model too complex, while
illustrating that it works for initialization of more than one parameter. Let’s try
to make the picture clearer. Formally, there are four sequences that this model
generates. Each of these sequences is of length 2. We can pair up these sequences
with corresponding indices containing two parameters.
(21) 00: 〈g1, s1〉
(22) 01: 〈g1, s2〉
(23) 10: 〈g2, s1〉
(24) 11: 〈g2, s2〉
Here, each sequence is paired up with a unique index. Generation of each se-
quence then corresponds to and models initialization of two parameters. How-
ever, note that each sequence is associated with a distinct initialization pattern.
For instance, if it is (23) that is generated, then the taste parameter, g, is ini-
tialized by the context of assessment, while the information state parameter, s,
is initialized by the context of use. Moreover, if it is (23) that is generated, we
make sense of why Bano retracts her assertion of (3). (23) also explains why
a speaker can retract her previous taste assertions, while not retracting their
previous assertions of the form might p. As other sequences can be generated
as well, say (21), a speaker can stand by an assertion of (3), even if their tastes
have changed (see discourse in (13)). We can explicitly state a few facts about
the model below.
(25) For any two parameters σ and τ , σ can be set by c1, while τ is set by c2.
(26) A discrete step in the computation models initialization of a parameter
by one of the contexts.
There are two further questions that we intend to answer about the model.
(27) Does our model explain why the context of assessment (or of utterance
for that matter) initializes the parameter it does in a given situation?
(28) What do 0 and 1 encode?
We think that the two questions are related. Let’s start with (28). Take two
speakers A and B who assert (3), i.e. licorice is tasty. Later both experience
changes in their taste standards such that neither likes licorice anymore. The
difference between the two is that A retracts her assertion, while B doesn’t.
Given this variance in their retraction patterns, we can claim that while A finds it
appropriate to retract, B doesn’t. We let 0 and 1 encode the absence and presence
of such an appropriateness judgment. Now consider A for whom such judgment
about assertions of taste is present, and such judgment about assertions of might
p-type utterances is absent. Then, this is encoded as the string 10, which is
paired up with (23). What we eventually generate is the index of evaluation,
〈g2, s1〉. To answer (27), we can say that whether a context of assessment or
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context of utterance initializes a given parameter depends on the presence or
absence of the appropriateness judgment of the speaker talked about above.
This concludes our discussion the formal model that captures Pluralism, and
comes out to have more empirical coverage than non-indexical contextualism or
assessment-sensitivity taken on its own.
6 Taking stock
What we have presented above is a model that tries to make room for variance
as explained above, and relies crucially on a formalization of initialization. Here,
we want to stress that this is to be considered a part of the usual Kaplanian
context-dependence picture. In other words, we have presented a way to think
about what the initial values of the index of evaluation can be. We haven’t
revolutionized shifting etc. so all the shifting by operators occurs in the usual
way.
From the relativist’s perspective, the Pluralism and the accompanying model
should be a welcome result. If what distinguishes non-indexical contextualism
and relativism is retraction, and the jury is still out to judge this difference (cf.
Ninan 2016) and there’s data like (13), then our model provides respite for the
relativist. Furthermore, our model vindicates MacFarlane’s positing of a separate
context as essential to relativism.11 We argued that contexts of assessment are
essential to a theory of context-dependence more generally, as we build our model
on the assumption that there are two relevant contexts for evaluating truth of a
given proposition.
The model presented might have implications for issues other than the ones
we were concerned with in this paper. To conclude our discussion, we touch on
one such issue. Suppes (1979) critiques set-theoretical semantics by stating that
the psychology of the speakers is “barely touched” by set-theoretical semantics
(cf. Steinhert-Threlkeld & Icard 2013). Psychology of the speakers as in their
appropriateness judgments underlying retraction patterns do find a home in our
model. Whether this captures the psychology of the speakers in some substantial
way, or only barely touches it is a question we haven’t explored here. Nonethe-
less, we do think that we have taken a step in the right direction. However, we
should note that our model differs from the sort of models that try to capture
psychological processes like verification of quantified sentences more directly,
where one sees a direct correspondence between the form of the model and the
psychological processing.12 Our automaton doesn’t seem to have any such direct
correspondence.
11See Lasersohn 2005 and Stephenson 2007 for relativisms without contexts of as-
sessment.
12See van Benthem (1986), Steinhert-Threlkeld & Icard 2013 for such models. See
McMillan et al. 2005, Szymanik 2007, and Szymanik and Zajenkowski 2010 for exper-
iments and comments on such experiments.
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